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Urban 1

Précis
China’s Fifth Generation Filmmakers1 brought forth a burst of transformative cinema, but
it could not be done without the strong historical antecedents of cultural turmoil and official
censorship steered by the singular political course of the Chinese Communist Party. This group
of filmmakers, particularly Chen Kaige (b. 1952), Tian Zhuangzhuang (b. 1952), and Zhang
Yimou (b. 1951), produced a national cinema that was defined by censorship. It became their
dilemma to define a course within the confines of censorship that not only absorbed the duality
of censorship, which serves to both condemn and to promote, but also defied and altered that
course to serve their own purposes. Their films became experiments at resolving this dilemma.
Each filmmaker focused on his own unique way of recanting censorship boundaries, but together
they brought Chinese cinema to the forefront of world attention. Unfortunately, this legacy
served to entrap them in a self-censorship of expectations. They have found it difficult to
progress beyond their own achievements as they continue to face a double standard of censorship
both by their government and by national critics who decry their work as biased by Orientalism
and Westernization. Their circumscription by censorship is complete and unprecedented.

1

The phrase “Fifth Generation Filmmakers” refers to the group of filmmakers who all graduated from Beijing Film
Academy in 1982. They were the first group of filmmakers to graduate since the end of the Cultural Revolution in
1976 and are noted for their ability to challenge traditional ways of producing narratives on the big screen.
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Bibliographical Essay
China’s Fifth Generation filmmakers have achieved an iconic stature in their own nation
as well as in the West based upon their initial 1990s offerings as purveyors of a new form of
dissent against their closed society. Initially their “emergence” was captured in journal articles
centering on film criticism as the relative novelty of their type of quality film opened the
international vision to Chinese film and its associated historiography. However, the “New
Cinema” of the Fifth Generation filmmakers, particularly Chen Kaige, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and
Zhang Yimou, has become the focus of intensive study as a direct result of films, banned in their
own country, attaining major success in the international film festivals. Add the post-socialist
“opening” of China in recent decades to the mix, and these works of the Fifth Generation
filmmakers have become virtual icons. Their vision of China has become accepted as
mainstream representations of the period, and actual texts centering specifically on this handful
of films are studied in universities. The volume of university press books and specific
film/history books has grown exponentially over time as both East Asian studies and film studies
have exploded as fields of formal study. The enormous amount of material available now on the
Fifth Generation filmmakers has served as a double-edged sword—the ordeal of becoming a
living legend is that the artist must constantly work against an often inflated image of self.
A basic understanding of the history of the span of the Maoist years (pre- and post-) is
provided in the textbook, Revolution and Its Past by R. Keith Schoppa (Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2006). Schoppa covers a great deal of ground in a compressed space in his treatment of the
People’s Republic of China, providing a strong introduction to the central facts that propelled
modern Chinese history forward. The compressed format of this textbook does not prevent it
from giving full scope to the timeframes it describes. Honing in on the distinct nature of Chinese
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Communism, Franz Michael’s Mao and the Perpetual Revolution ( Barron’s, 1977) is also a
fundamental read as it gives a detailed comparison of the Marxist-Leninist brand of communism
with what would come to be known as Maoism. Although it is more limited in its scope, a
timeline playing the rise of Soviet communism contrasted against Chinese communism is a good
reference tool as well as some primary source documents contained in the appendix.
In order to fully understand the impact of censorship on the Fifth Generation filmmakers,
it is critical to understand how the Chinese have viewed media in the past. In A History of the
Press and Public Opinion in China by Lin Yutang (Greenwood Press, 1968) censorship is
traced from Ancient China to contemporary times. While the focus of this book is on literary
and journalistic censorship, it is an invaluable resource as it provides excellent details and
statistics pertinent to its topic. Geremie R. Barmé and John Minford’s Seeds of Fire:
Chinese Voices of Conscience (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988) is structured much like a
scrapbook in that each chapter consists of selections from various Chinese voices, such as
novelists, political prisoners, poets, organized around a particular subject. The section on Yellow
Earth was particularly excellent. After a brief synopsis of the plot, the chapter presented quotes
as arguments for and against the new art form. This lively cogent exchange was extremely
readable and provided a thorough and thoughtful examination of some of the reasons why critics
disapproved of the Fifth Generation filmmakers. Further chapters include discussions revolving
around dissent and the Cultural Revolution. Each element makes careful use of popular
selections, such as the use of the invented word “Urbling” that defined the “educated youth” who
were to become the Fifth Generation filmmakers.
In order to understand more fully how the arts were viewed during the formative years of
the Fifth Generation filmmakers, it is necessary to understand what role the arts were supposed
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to play in Maoist society. Problems of Art and Literature by Mao Tse-Tong (International
Publishers, 1950) is the primary document that encapsulates Mao’s direct words on the matter.
Mao instructs artists regarding the four categories of the masses that art should serve. The
importance of the role of Mao’s wife in suppressing the arts, specifically film, during the
Cultural Revolution, as well as her creation of the revolutionary ballets, is thoroughly revealed in
Comrade Chiang Ch’ing by Roxanne Witke (Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
Having laid out the foundation for study of the background against which the Fifth
Generation filmmakers arose, a similar groundwork is laid for Chinese cinema studies with two
books that both are dated but contain unique perspectives on narrow time bands of motion
picture history. The first of these books is Dianying: An Account of Films and the Film
Audience in China by Jay Leyda (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972). This
volume follows the history of cinema in China from the first showing of a Lumiere film in
Shanghai in 1896 through to 1967. The value of reviewing this book is the depiction of the preCultural Revolution film industry and a chilling report by a Soviet observer on the complete
shut-down of the movie studios in 1966. Another intriguing aspect that this early book provides
is the notion of films about minority nationalities in China, something that the Fifth Generation
filmmakers centered on in their dissent. Chinese Film: The State of the Art in the People’s
Republic, edited by George Stephen Semsel ( Praeger, 1987) is a classic work that provides a
detailed report on how the Chinese film studios and distribution channels were set up. It also
firmly placed Chinese film strongly in the field of political activism well before the People’s
Republic of China. A solid discussion of the early films of the Fifth Generation filmmakers,
centering particularly on The Yellow Earth, serves as a solid introduction to the characteristics to
be found within these films. It is interesting that in both of these books, both authors note that
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they are restricted in their ability to grasp the depth of the field due to their inability to read
and/or speak not only Mandarin but Cantonese and the many other languages of mainland China.
This basic language barrier remains a restriction on research and self-censorship since only
translated materials can be used.
Parallels to Soviet communist cinema are worth noting, especially in light of the concept
of censorship. In Cinema & Soviet Society, 1917-1953 by Peter Kenez (Cambridge
University Press, 1992), the notion that communism alone imposes censorship is dispelled. A
full section devoted to censorship also recounts the personality idolatry around Stalin akin to that
around Mao. The aspects of how national cinema was handled during major transitions within
the Soviet Communist Party can also be gleaned.
The roots of the Fifth Generation filmmakers are captured not only in the interviews that
have been given by each of the directors involved since the 1990s but also in Memoirs from the
Beijing Film Academy: The Genesis of China’s Fifth Generation by Ni Zhen (Duke
University Press, 2002). This critical resource, written by their teacher, provides the ultimate
“insider” look at how the Chinese film industry operated showcasing the background and
specific philosophies and talents of each director. It changed the state of the field by affording
non-Chinese researchers the opportunity to hear directly from someone so deeply connected not
only professionally to the Chinese film industry himself but also personally as teacher of this
group, providing unparallel accessibility into their origins. It also offers a look at other Fifth
Generation filmmakers who have not “translated” to international recognition. The postscript of
this book addresses the controversial comments that have come to be hurled against the Fifth
Generation filmmakers including accusations of both post-colonialism and Eurocentrism
entering into their works. It is the author’s viewpoint that neither of these issues informs the

Urban 6
“classic” films of the Fifth Generation filmmakers. In fact, controversy has followed the
footsteps of the Fifth Generation directors as and the “opening” of the Chinese economy and
society, seems to have diminished the power of their current work—film that does not seem to
incorporate the aspects of dissent seen earlier. While it must be remembered that the “classic”
films such as The Blue Kite have never even been seen in China, could it be that censorship
actually served to promote their films? Has the spirit of non-cooperation died due to commercial
success abroad? Did the filmmakers cave in to Westernization, enjoying commercialization and
international horizons more than catering to national interests?
Addressing all criticisms directly, Zhang Yimou in Zhang Yimou: Interviews edited
by Frances Gateward (University of Mississippi, 2001) speaks directly to the central debates
surrounding the early works of his generation of filmmakers, specifically censorship and
Orientalism. King of the Children & The New Chinese Cinema by Chen Kaige, Wan Zhi,
and Tony Rayns (Faber and Faber, 1989) also provides an opportunity to hear directly from
the director about one of his films.
There are many actual film critiques of the Fifth Generation classic films of the late
80s/early 90s. An excellent primary source, Speaking in Images by Michael Berry (Columbia
University Press, 2005) presents interviews with modern Chinese filmmakers. This volume
focuses on the distinction among the three bases of Chinese cinema—Mainland China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong. Discussions of the controversies that each director has had to deal with provide
solid information. Hearing directly the frustration of Zhang Yimou on the subject of his critics
verified the dilemma of the Fifth Generation filmmakers. The pre-eminent authority on Chinese
cinema, Chris Berry, has written several penetrating collections of essays on various topics such
as Postsocialist Cinema in Post-Mao China: The Cultural Revolution after the Cultural
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Revolution (Routledge, 2004) and with Mary Farquhar, China on Screen: Cinema and
Nation (Columbia University Press, 2006). In this latter volume, an excellent timeline is
presented with side-by-side columns comparing general history versus cinema history.
However, the real value here is in a chapter titled “Time and the National” wherein the whole
concept of historiology is defined and shown against the context of Fifth Generation films such
as The Yellow Earth and Red Sorghum. Another excellent recent book is Reinventing China:
A Generation and Its Films by Paul Clark (The Chinese University Press, 2005) which
devotes its whole content to the Fifth Generation, concentrating on descriptions of the people
behind the art and the films themselves, including some of the little-known Fifth Generation
directors. It does not discuss audience reaction to the films in any detail. New Chinese
Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics edited by Nick Browne, Paul G. Pickowicz, Vivian
Sobchack, and Esther Yau. (Cambridge University Press, 1994) brings together seasoned
Chinese film authorities to explore the interplay of Communist ideology with their national
cinema. The impact of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre on the Chinese film industry and
its subsequent effect on the perception of the Fifth Generation filmmakers provided an important
perspective.
Criticism of Chinese film by the Chinese themselves has started to make its way to the
West. Some of this criticism is startling to Western readers who have definitely acquired a
certain socio-political acceptance of their own perspective on another nation’s history by
accepting such films as To Live and The Blue Kite as accurate depictions of Chinese life. China
Pop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids, and Bestsellers Are Transforming a Culture by Jianying
Zha (The New Press, 1995) affords another intimate look at Chen Kaige but adds some
refreshingly new context in terms of a perceived competition with Zhang Yimou. The fickle role

Urban 8
of the censorship of Chen Kaige’s film, Farewell My Concubine, and the lack of respect shown
by current Chinese media for such pre-eminent directors are elements presented in the book.
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Introduction
This paper will examine the influence of censorship on a specific group of Chinese
filmmakers known as the Fifth Generation, and the dilemma it has created for these artists.
Media in China has always been subject to censorship as it has always been recognized as a
powerful influence. By surveying the role of censorship over a historical timeline from ancient
times to the present, it can be seen how each political unit handled their authority over this tool.
Focusing on the modern era, the evolution of censorship has caused many changes to literature
and the arts. A detailed analysis is made of modes of resistance—aesthetic, historical, and
cultural—used within three prominent Fifth Generation films to demonstrate their manipulation
of censorship.
Ancient Antecedents
“Chinese cinema has always had a strong political orientation.”2 This path was the direct
result of the traditions of Chinese history which have long included censorship as an integral part
of political culture. As early as the reign of the first Emperor of Qin in the second century B.C.,
the government permitted the burning of books that it found objectionable and allowed the
persecution of authors.3 Yet, “Chinese political theory admitted the necessity of someone
responsible for the criticism of the government and even of the Emperor himself…”4 Therefore,
in a government system unique to China, there were official imperial censors who served in a

2

Ma Ning quoted in Chinese Film: The State of the Art in the People’s Republic, ed. George Stephen Semsel (New
York, Connecticut, & London: Praeger, 1987), 63.
3
In 213 B.C., the Chancellor of the state of Qin, Li Si, ordered the burning of historical records and literature that
were not written by Qin historians. He also mandated that only the state should produce political books. When
scholars, many of whom were Confucian, protested, 460 of them were ordered buried alive. In 1772, the Manchu
Emperor Qianlong commenced the compilation of the Siku Quanshu (Complete Library of Four Treasurers) with the
ambition of cataloging and preserving the best manuscripts in his empire. Instead, Qianlong ended up becoming
increasingly focused on eradicating anti-Manchuism from the literary record and ordered the destruction of over
150,000 volumes. This was a completely different mission than he had intended at the onset. Yutang Lin, A History
of the Press and Public Opinion in China (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 167.
4
ibid, 6 & 7.
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symbiotic relationship with the emperor—a type of moral compass that could be a source of
good or evil depending on the political climate and personalities of the day.5 And while “…the
common people thought very little about current politics…” there was a rich tradition of
unofficial public censorship wherein scholars took on a very visible and active role in “beating
the drum” in front of palace gates as powerful and successful mass movements.6 Overall, the
attitude towards censorship could be summed up in a quote by Confucius: “The people may be
allowed to act, but may not be allowed to know.”7
Censorship Discovers Cinema
Early Chinese cinema of the 1920s followed the Hollywood formula of using popular
themes and storylines that had become internationally pervasive. These were the heady days of
pre-Hays Code U. S. cinema.8 Changes that swept post WWI Western societies created a whole
new standard of social freedom and sexual mores where everything was “modernized.” Chinese
cinema and society, in general, followed this lead. The influence of film brought about the idea
that “[a]nything foreign is modern, whether it be a social usage or a style of dress.”9
The Nationalist state was cognizant of the popular power that cinema possessed. The
Nanjing government began to wage its censorship campaign when the first Chinese sound film
was made in 1931.10 As a central component of their official policy, Mandarin Chinese (guoyu—
the “national language”), became the spoken language used in film. Use of dialects was
restricted. The central Nanjing government believed that the use of local dialect promoted

5

ibid.
ibid, 7 & 8.
7
Originally in The Analects by Confucius, Book 8, Verse 9. ibid, 3.
8
The Hays Code took effect in the United States in 1934, but was originally thought up in 1930. It was abandoned
in 1968 with the birth of the rating system we presently in the United States.
9
B.Y. Lee, “Modernists and Anti-Modernists in China,” China Weekly Review, May 26, 1934: 498.
10
The first Chinese sound film was entitled Sing-Song Red Peony and was directed by Zhang Shichuan. Chris Berry
and Mary Farquhar, China On Screen: Cinema and Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 52.
6
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regional separatism.11 This was a prominent factor in the political split between the central
government authority in Nanjing and the opposing separatist government in Canton. Not only
did the southern and Cantonese studios not want to lose their economic markets in Hong Kong
and in overseas Chinese communities, but neither did their local government want to lose its
“…claim of ‘regional uniqueness.’”12

When the Canton regime lost one of its key leaders, Hu

Hanmin in 1935, the National Film Censorship Committee (NFCC), a central government
organization, put their restrictions on dialects firmly into place. However, enforcement of their
limitations was not possible and Cantonese studios often just ignored them.13
By the mid-1930s censorship was burgeoning under the Nationalist government across all
areas. Edgar Snow presented statistics that there were “2,500 political prisoners in the great
prison at Nanking.”14 He further catalogued the repression North China: 110 suspensions of
publications of various types, with over “…230 political prisoners, including many students,
artists, teachers and writers…[In] 1934 arrests in this category…totaled over 800.”15 Beyond
this, the Peiping Chronicle “…records that 149 books were banned on a list issued on December
29, 1934.”16 Among these were “…many of the best works of contemporary Chinese
writers…including 11 books by Lu Hsun, ‘father of the modern Chinese story’.”17 Communist
writers were the targets of even more extreme censorship. In 1931 five communist writers were
executed as the Nationalists battled the increasing popularity that communism held for the
young, and viciously sought to eradicate it.18

11

Cinema and Urban Culture in Shanghai, ed. Yingjin Zhang (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 184.
ibid, 184 & 185.
13
ibid, 187.
14
Lin, History of Press and Public Opinion, 172.
15
ibid, 173.
16
ibid.
17
ibid.
18
ibid.
12

Urban 12
The Nationalist government “…wanted modernity in China, but rejected its inherent
foreignness.”19 So it attempted to suppress the rising liberalism with respect to social mores
promoted by the film industry, censoring portrayals of progressive lifestyles that involved
sensual clothing, kissing, or pre-marital cohabitation.20 The government was so intent on
bringing scientific modernity to China that they waged an Anti-superstition Campaign. This
campaign censored any film dealing with religious subjects. But it further extended the
definition of “superstitious films” (shenguai dianying) to include anything “unscientific” such as
martial art films (wuxia shenguai pian) or “strange” (guai) such as Alice in Wonderland or horror
films like Frankenstein.21 The notion of banning such films was fortified by scholarly critics
such as Mao Dun (1896-1981), who believed that they “…perpetuat[ed] feudal ideology and
induc[ed] audiences to escape into a fantasy world rather than face their problems in reality.”22
They warned against such “soft” films, claiming they “…anaesthetized the public instead of
rousing its awareness, and…spread reactionary views under the pretext of entertainment.”23 On
a more pragmatic basis, the banning of these magic/ghost movies was welcomed by the major
studios because it diminished their competition with the smaller studios that produced such
films.24
Another institution arose at this time that served to re-channel the direction of Chinese
cinema. Luo Mingyou25 built an entirely new film company, Lianhua, in 1929 that was
dedicated to “…the choice of contemporary themes, handled in a realistic fashion, which deeply

19

Cinema in Shanghai, ed. Zhang, 193.
ibid.
21
ibid, 190.
22
ibid, 191.
23
“Kwok & M.C. Quiquemelle – Chinese Cinema and Realism,” in Film & Politics in the Third World, ed. John
D.H. Downing (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1987), 182.
24
Cinema in Shanghai, ed. Zhang, 191.
25
According to Kwok & Quiquemelle, in 1929 Luo Mingyou was a twenty-seven year old theater chain owner for
the provinces of North China and Shanghai.
20
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moved the public at the time, alert to subjects close to its own experience.”26 The fact that these
realistic Chinese films “…could now rival foreign films on an artistic plane” provided the film
industry with a new audience of young intellectuals who had hitherto dismissed their national
cinema.27 Unfortunately, occupation of Manchuria and the many heavy Japanese attacks on such
cities as Shenyang (1931) and Shanghai (1932) took a heavy toll on the film industry. In
Shanghai, “…where fighting raged for several weeks, part of the city was razed.”28 “…[T]hirty
studios were destroyed and many small companies forced to close. Out of a total of thirty-nine
theaters, sixteen were in ruins, including most of the theaters specializing in Chinese films.”29
Censorship Serves the State
It was during this tumultuous time that the League of Left Writers reached out to the
Communist Party to interest them in participating in the arts. They reacted swiftly and strongly
to this open invitation into the film arts in particular, seeing that “…the realistic current…sat
perfectly with their program of struggle against feudalism and imperialism, via the denunciation
of social ills and the awakening of national feelings.”30 With the advent of the Communist
Party’s entrance into filmmaking, studios fell under the influence of the Soviet Union, and their
film industry’s portrayal of social realism became the norm. Many went to the USSR for
training. Here they saw the effects of the Stalinist view of the film industry, about which a
conference in 1928 had proclaimed: “The feature film should become an instrument of
communist education and agitation and weapon of the Party in the education and organization of
the masses around the basic tasks in the period of building socialism…”31

26

“Chinese Cinema,” in Film & Politics, ed. Downing, 182 & 183.
ibid.
28
ibid, 184.
29
ibid.
30
ibid.
31
Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society 1917-1953 (Santa Cruz, CA: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 104.
27
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In the infancy of the Chinese Communist Party’s formation, Mao Zedong took the
example of Soviet Communism seriously with respect to the issue of how the arts were to be
handled. Mao concurred with the Soviet Communist viewpoint and stated that “In order to
overthrow a political power, it is always necessary to create public opinion, to do work in the
ideological sphere.”32 The work of the Nationalists had pushed China towards the new and
scientific by molding Chinese society into a pasteurized homogeny through censorship of the
arts, and this aligned with Mao’s own ideas. Among Mao’s early influences was the work of
Chen Duxiu, a dean at Peking University, who endorsed “…a total break with China’s traditional
past…and complete westernization…”33 Mao’s study of Chen Duxiu led him to the essays of Hu
Shi who put forward the idea that Chinese writing should be broadened to break the
“…monopoly of a scholarly elite, and to replace it by pai hua, the actual spoken language used
by the people.”34 These views became the central basis for those of the Chinese Communist
Party.
But Mao further defined his own vision of the Problems of Art and Literature in his
conference with writers and artists from across China in May 1942, in Yan’an. Here he
expounded his unique contribution to communism that unequivocally set the revolutionary
purpose to “…first and foremost…get to know the people and to understand their ways.”35 This
emphasis on the people as exemplars of richness and wisdom was a strong departure from the
Leninists who “…assumed that there was nothing worthwhile in the peasant way of life and that
their task was to persuade the peasants to change it.”36 In one brilliant, deft stroke, Mao exploits

32

Franz Michael, An Illuminating Study of Mao Tse-tung’s Role in China and World Communism: Mao and the
Perpetual Revolution, ed. I.E. Cadenhead Jr. (Woodbury, NY: Barron’s, 1977), 149.
33
ibid, 5.
34
ibid.
35
Mao Tse-tung, Problems of Art and Literature (New York: International Publishers, 1950), 11.
36
Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 90.
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the duality of censorship by saying that “…literature and art…must...serve…” the working class,
peasantry, and armed forces.37 Furthermore, “…the masses are not able to appreciate theories if
they are abstract.”38 The confluence of these two statements effectively “…conflate[s] author
and audience, requiring that writers should always express the will of the masses. Since the
opinion of the masses would be ventriloquized by the state ideologues, the Party would thus be
able to maintain absolute control.”39 Mao “…instated the Party as the only organ regulating the
transmission of ideology…”40 He did this emphatically and yet injected the element of what he
would later deem “revolutionary romanticism.”41 He would later state that “[n]ature provides the
only source material for literature and art in their finished form.”42 In short, the use of cinema
became “…a powerful cultural means for the legitimization of the new sociopolitical order
established in 1949.”43
With the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese film industry
was nationalized and government film came to a virtual standstill, producing just one film in
1951 and only four in 1952.44 The film industry was changing to incorporate the ideology of the
Yan’an conference, superseding socialist realism with a “realism tinged with reformist ideas….in
Chinese, called revolutionary realism.”45 The period of the 1950s and 1960s was “…a relatively

37

Mao, Problems of Art and Literature, 18.
ibid, 12.
39
Yomi Braester, Witness Against History: Literature, Film, and Public Discourse in Twentieth Century China
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 115.
40
ibid, 22.
41
“Chinese Cinema,” in Film & Politics, ed. Downing, 191.
42
Mao, Problems of Art and Literature, 25.
43
New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics, ed. Nick Browne, Paul G. Pickowicz, Vivian Sobchack, and
Esther Yau (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21.
44
“Chinese Cinema,” in Film & Politics, ed. Downing, 189.
45
ibid, 189 & 190.
38
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flexible, less doctrinaire period…” in a film industry that was striving to attain the correct level
of realism.46
Censorship for the Masses
Towards the end of 1963, Chinese censorship of the arts took on a whole new face—that
of Jiang Qing. Mao’s third wife, Jiang Qing (1914-1991) was a former minor actress who, in her
own words, “…was not a brilliant actress,”47 but who had risen in the highly charged political
and artistic center that was pre-revolutionary Shanghai. She worked hard for her roles and
reached the pinnacle of her acting career playing the leading role of Nora in Ibsen’s feminist
drama, A Doll’s House.48 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not approve of Mao’s
interest in an actress but had permitted their marriage as inevitable. However, it is commonly
believed that they also added a proviso that restricted her from becoming involved in politics.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, little was publicly known of her.
Jiang became fiercely resentful of the roles played by the wives of other top Party
officials, such as Wang Guangmei and Deng Yingchao, who received recognition and public
acknowledgement as their husbands’ partners.49 Seeking to establish a role for herself, in the
mid-1960’s Jiang revived her interest in the arts and began a thorough study of the current film
and theater offerings. She proudly brought to Mao’s attention the fact that many films contained
anti-Party sentiments, earning his attention. Mao began to recognize that Jiang could be of use to
him in the next chapter of history he wanted to write. So he provided her with his support,
approving her pronouncements, which were instrumental in dismissing many leading writers,
actors, and film directors. Total censorship reigned supreme:
46

ibid, 192.
Roxane Witke, “Comrade Chiang Ch’ing Tells Her Story” Time Magazine, March 12, 1977, 47.
48
Roxane Witke, Comrade Chiang Ch’ing (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1977), 101 & 102.
49
Wang Guangmei is the spouse of the Liu Shaoqi, the second Chairman of the People’s Republic of China. Deng
Yingchao is the wife of Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China.
47
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In other countries a play or novel or story continues its public life long after its
film adaptation has been condemned, preached against, or shelved, but in China
official adverse criticism affects, retroactively, everyone and everything attached
to the quarantined film. An attack on a director or a film writer results in the
withdrawal of all films and books signed by the offenders, from circulation and
from history.50
Mao had himself signaled the beginning of the Cultural Revolution with his famous swim
in the Yangzi River in 1966. Later Mao galvanized the start of the Cultural Revolution when he
wrote a big-character poster with instructions to “Bombard the Headquarters.” He authorized the
Red Guard to be his “…vanguard in the class struggle.” The youth of the Red Guard were
electrified by the mission Mao had given them to undertake, and took up his call to destroy the
four olds—ideas, habits, customs, and culture. Jiang was an iconoclast and was proud of the
work of “her” Red Guard as they destroyed books, temples, museums, and scholarly works. The
Red Guard also persecuted and tortured (often to death) intellectuals, scientists, and teachers.
Both Mao and Jiang took the opportunity to rid themselves of enemies. Mao concentrated on
purging the Party leadership. Both Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were disposed of--one by
death; the other by exile.51 Jiang also used the Cultural Revolution to take her revenge on
personal enemies in her life and had no qualms about doing so.
Revolutionary Arts
Mao’s proclamation was her guidepost: “Revolutionary literature and art should create a
variety of characters out of real life and help the masses to propel history forward.”52 Jiang’s
quest was to instill all art forms with a social role. “Make it revolutionary or ban it” was her
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slogan.53 Cinema effectively stopped in China during the period of 1966 through 1970. Instead,
Jiang began to personally rewrite several major ballets, such as the Red Detachment of Women
and White-Haired Girl, casting them in modern time, forming the basis for her “model operas”.
These ballets were carefully modernized to remove non-revolutionary topics. In doing so, Jiang
reformed dance by instructing ballerinas to perform men’s steps, breaking down the division in
ballet over what gender did what type of dance. Her model plays also provided strong leading
roles for women. Furthermore, Jiang required all artistic productions to adhere to the “Principle
of the Three Stresses”—“Of all the characters, stress the positive ones. Of the positive
characters, stress the heroic ones. Of the main [heroic] characters, stress the central one.”54
There were to be no “middle characters here to blur the lines, no irresolute endings to confuse
and depress the audience.”55 This was totally in line with Mao’s proclamation in Yan'an against
ambiguity. By the mid-1970s, the eight model operas began to appear as feature film
productions.56
Critics thought that Jiang had gone too far in suppressing movies and considered the
revolutionary operas boring in their dogmatism. Jiang Qing’s former Shanghai art community
was particularly critical of her actions and claimed that her political art for the masses was
second-rate. Some have even come to defend her work, such as Yang Chunxia, the main female
actor in the opera The Azalea Mountain, who claims that these “…are still unsurpassed as
monumental productions.”57
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The next two years found the violence of the Red Guard factions intensifying beyond
the control of the Party. Finally the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was called in to restrain the
violence and the majority of the Red Guard youth were sent to the countryside to be re-educated
by the peasants. Society found itself joining in the violence of the times, and families were
destroyed, often forever, as members were variously sent to labor or re-education camps. Jiang
Qing was extremely active in gathering power to herself throughout the 10-year period of the
Cultural Revolution. She had associated herself with Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and
Yao Wenyuan, and they had become the “Gang of Four.”58 The four were called “the
helicopters” by Deng Xiaoping because their rise was so abrupt from obscurity.59 Jiang Qing
had finally earned her place at the pinnacle of power within the Party. She truly believed that
she would be capable of running the country as Mao’s successor. However, while Mao
continued to support Jiang, and it was certain that he did not want Deng Xiaoping take power, he
appointed Hua Guofeng as acting premier. This led to fierce infighting among the political
factions.
End of an Era
When Mao died in 1976, Jiang Qing took her part in the mourning, leaving a wreath
“from your student” for her husband. Shortly afterwards, Hua Guofeng had the Gang of Four
arrested. This was relatively easy to do, because while the Gang of Four “dominated media and
education,”60 they did not have good military support. Although Mao was behind her, Jiang
Qing had little support within the Party, and she had made many enemies during the purges of
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the Cultural Revolution. During their trial, all were found guilty and confessed, with the sole
exception of Jiang Qing.61 The death sentences that were handed out were commuted to prison
terms. In 1991 Jiang was found dead, hanged in what authorities deemed to be a suicide.
Most commentaries on the Gang of Four seem to agree that “there was no separate
‘radical’ faction while Mao was alive; there was only Mao’s “high command.”62 Jiang Qing
acted in perfect alignment with Mao’s thoughts and was used by Mao as a shield to further his
own ideologies. Perhaps, in the end, she was “purer” in her belief in those philosophies than
even Mao, since she did not hesitate to act upon them. New literature has attempted to position
Jiang Qing differently in history, pointing out that she had to contend with “…slander piled
on…[her character]…and deep-seated gender discrimination among Mao’s revolutionary
comrades.”63 Those who came into power after Mao were more than willing to make her the
whipping post for everything that occurred in the Cultural Revolution, and it has suited Western
and current CCP interests to seek any diminution of Maoism. As Jiang said at her trial, “What I
did followed Mao’s line and the Party’s line.”64 The names of many officials in the then-current
Deng Xiaoping government could be found on Party documents authorizing the acts of the
Cultural Revolution, even that of the beloved Zhou Enlai. Jiang put her role in history into
perspective with her statement that “Everything I did, Mao told me to do. I was his dog: what
he said to bite, I bit.”65 However, the irretrievable loss of so many lives and the misery endured
by so many under her name during the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution has rendered any
further defense impossible.
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Filmmakers of the Urbling Generation
The Beijing Film Institute reopened in 1978. “At the beginning, no one knew very well
how the political situation would develop, and the reorganization of the studio took time.”66
During this time, it is noted that two types of film genre came into play: films inspired by the
“literature of scars” (shan hen wenxue) and basic entertainment films. The latter was important
as “this type of film answered a real need in the public, wearied by the political rhetoric of the
Cultural Revolution.”67
The distinctive concept of using the term “generations” has been coined to distinguish
the waves of Chinese filmmakers. This term denotes not only a historical time table of
filmmakers but something far more profound, “…the mission of an era[,]…their moral concerns
and their real effects on the future…”68 The strengths of these generations of Chinese
filmmakers derive from the fact that they are basic socio-political units that share a common
context but with individual creative responses and styles. In 1978 the Fourth Generation, who
had been denied an outlet for their art throughout the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, came
back to the studios, not only to take up where they left off with their own artistic pursuits, but
also to train a new generation of filmmakers. Their students, the class of 1982, became known as
the Fifth Generation filmmakers.
One of the chief characteristics of the Fifth Generation filmmakers is that they
originated from what has been called the “Urbling” generation. This invented word refers to the
educated youth who grew up during the Cultural Revolution and took part in the often draconian
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“up into the mountains and down to the countryside” program.69 This thoroughly novel plan
shifted some four million youth from urban centers to be “re-educated” by the peasants in the
rural wilderness of China in an effort not only to uphold Maoist ideology but to physically
maintain control over an entire generation of youth.70 This experience served to disillusion many
as they saw firsthand what national Chinese realities were, positioning their generation to
become disenchanted with the distorted CCP line.71
Born in 1952, Chen Kaige and Tian Zhuangzhuang were childhood friends and shared a
common background in that their parents were involved in the arts and grew up in Beijing Film
Studio housing, providing them with a basic creative environment.72 But, more importantly, they
shared the trauma of having their homes and possessions ruthlessly ransacked and had to
withstand seeing their parents subjected to public punishment as “members of the Black gang in
literature and the arts” and forced to do supervised labor.73 Tian Zhuangzhuang’s parents were
artists in the Communist base in Yan’an, but Chen Kaige’s father was less fortunate, coming
from the Nationalist-controlled area. In the ugliness of the times, Chen Kaige found himself
pushing and denouncing his own father at a struggle session.74 75 While Chen found himself sent
to the forests of Xishuangbanna in Yunnan Province, Tian Zhuangzhuang went to a small village
in northeast China on the Nen River. These specific experiences in the rural areas helped to
mold their future cinematic vision prompting “…[t]heir ambivalence toward the land and
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primordial nature, and their determination to express it, [which] created a special visual style in
Chinese cinema.76
As the son of a former Nationalist army officer and a doctor, Zhang Yimou came from an
entirely different background. Growing up under the duress of his family’s classification, Zhang
was sent down to the countryside in Shaanxi Province where he did hard labor hauling bales of
cotton at the local mill. However, he also found a niche for his artistic abilities in painting
images of Chairman Mao on all the houses and offices in Beini Village and thus earning the
respect of the local leadership. Zhang realized that he wanted a life beyond the village,
however, and scrupulously saved over several years to buy a Chinese Seagull brand camera,
determined to teach himself landscape photography in the nearby mountains.77 When he finally
submitted his photos in 1978 to the Beijing Film Academy, Zhang was already five years above
the age threshold and could not take the enrollment exam. A special letter from the Minister of
Culture, Huang Zen, worked for and against Zhang as the Beijing Film Academy weighed their
decision to accept this student.78 Zhang’s acceptance into the program sealed the promise of the
class of 1982.
The ambitions of this film class were definitive, and all the members joined together to
further their particular philosophy. As Chen Kaige stated:
When we were at the Academy, we all shared the desire to develop film language. That
was a responsibility that our generation had to accept. Our film language had to be
different from previous Chinese cinema. We had to completely eliminate falseness in
film…We had to use a transformed language to tell history anew.79
This moment in time, poised between the death of Mao in 1976 and the 1989 massacre at
Tiananmen Square, was also serendipitous for their experimentation because the government
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subsidized their filmmaking, allowing them to focus on turning their philosophical concepts into
film.80 Even the threat of censorship, always present, did not dim their enthusiasm to create a
new course for the Chinese cinema that they envisioned. Censorship actually worked in the
opposite role as the Fifth Generation filmmakers used censorship as an element in their work,
constructing their work carefully to expose the contradictions of the political state within the
confines of severe restrictions. “…these filmmakers re-examined their own histories and that of
their culture and station. They in effect set out to reinvent China.”81
Innovative Ambiguity
Tony Rayns, an English film critic, dates the term “New Chinese Cinema” from April
12th, 1985, when Yellow Earth opened at a Hong Kong Film Festival.82 Yellow Earth, directed
by Chen Kaige, was the introductory calling
card of the Fifth Generation filmmakers, boldly
serving as the template for their unique style.
Here is the first example of the most critical
Image 1. Scene from Yellow Earth.
Cuiqiao waiting to ask Gu Qing
if she can accompany him.

facet of the Fifth Generation’s philosophy—its
use of ambiguity. “Ambiguity was precisely

the element most strenuously outlawed by Mao’s ‘Yan’an line’ on the arts.”83 Furthermore, in
the films of the Fifth Generation, “The heroes of the model plays give way to fallible human

80

Bert Cardullo, “Beyond the Fifth Generation: An Interview with Zhang Yimou,” Bright Lights Film Journal,
Issue 58 (2007), http://www.brightlightsfilm.com/58/58zhanggiv.html.
81
Paul Clark, Reinventing China: A Generation and Its Film, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005), 1.
82
Zhen, Memoirs, trans. Chris Berry, vii.
83
Tony Rayns, Chinese Vocabulary an Introduction to King of the Children and the New Chinese Cinema (London
& Boston: farber and farber, 1989), 30.

Urban 25
beings. Presenting a non-hero is perhaps the most radical divergence from the aesthetics of the
Cultural Revolution.”84
In order to make Yellow Earth, Chen Kaige took his company to the Loess Plateau in
northwest China, an area of severe rock terrain and caves. This environment served a dual
purpose—the vast harsh landscape served as a symbol of the unyielding feudalism that
dominated the lives of the peasants who worked that land, as well as infusing a subtle hint of
Mao, who ended his Long March in this geographic region. The ruthless inflexibility of nature
was captured by Director Chen’s cinematographer and fellow film student, Zhang Yimou, who
began his visual fascination with the device of rich color characterizations to highlight the
supreme hopelessness of the peasant struggle against the stark background.
Above all other characteristics in Yellow Earth, the almost anthropological naturalness of
vantage point first makes its appearance as a basis for Fifth Generation narration. Director Chen
approaches his characters much like in a documentary style. Ingeniously, the voice of the film is
contained in the plaintive and winsome folksongs that are sung by the main characters, Cuiqiao
and Hanhan, and enhance the plotline around which the whole story centers. Not only do these
songs fulfill the soldier’s quest, but they bridge and carry the plot of the movie forward. The
haunting songs reveal the inner thoughts and awakening desires for change in Cuiqiao. As a
matter of fact, Cuiqiao’s last dialogue is a song cut short, symbolizing her demise. The final allmale chant for rain around the primal totem figure recalls the timeless dominance of the past.
The critical politics within Yellow Earth are purposefully wrapped in ambiguity. Gu
Qing, the young soldier, is an idealized figure. He could almost be a caricature taken from the
model revolutionary ballets in his zestful energy to learn from and assist the most impoverished
peasants and teach them the value of his new thinking. His uniform is crisp and clean, and he is
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tall and young—all in direct contrast to the peasants, old before their time, and dressed in rags.
However, even with all his new revolutionary thoughts, Gu Qing is not truly independent; he is,
in fact, an anti-hero. He is constrained by Party rules and cannot help Cuiqiao achieve
“liberation” from the old ways. In fact, Gu Qing himself has no real freedom or capability to act
on his own and is just a cog of the Party, doing its bidding. This leaves the audience with an
uncomfortable feeling, a vague unease that things are not quite right, as the director intended,
while maintaining overall political neutrality. It also serves to “…deconstruct…one of the
Communist Party’s most cherished myths, which holds that Communist ideology spread like
wildfire through China’s peasant communities in the 1930s—as celebrated in countless
propaganda movies of the 1950s and 1960s.”85
In Yellow Earth, Director Chen achieved the perfect rebuttal of censorship that his Fifth
Generation of filmmakers held as their goal. He realized this by utilizing specific aesthetic
means to express a new path for Chinese cinema to follow and develop along.

In doing so,

“…the Fifth Generation both broke with tradition and maintained it, because they skipped the
fifties to pick up the humanist philosophy of classical China…”86
The reception of Yellow Earth by Chinese critics was comparable to that of the
Impressionists at the Exposition 1874 in Paris. The new art form they were presenting was
immediately the target of a barrage of harsh criticism. Critics “…found the perspective of the
director, Chen Kaige, and Zhang Yimou, his cinematographer, to be politically suspect,
condemning the film for using mass art as a vehicle to “display the backward and ignorant aspect
of the Chinese peasantry.”87 Director Chen was “…regarded as being too young to understand
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what Yan’an was all about, and he was accused of distorting the Communist spirit.”88 Even the
very real peasants that the Fifth Generation filmmakers used in their films were criticized for
being too realistic:
The peasant who sings the folk songs in the film is very ugly. Why did they have to go
and choose such an actor? The duty of film is to reflect life as realistically as possible,
and to retain its true face. But we must not encourage naturalism, nor let our film-makers
waste their energies by indulging in voyeurism and the depiction of the remnants of the
primitive past…”89
All in all, the criticism and subsequent banning of the film in China was based on the fact that no
one could quite comprehend the new Chinese cinema. “What are you supposed to do if you’ve
got a mass art form that the masses don’t understand?”90
Modes of Resistance
If, in making Yellow Earth, Chen Kaige utilized an aesthetic mode of resistance against
the censorship of the Chinese Communist Party, with his use of landscape and folklore, it can be
argued that his classmates, Tian Zhuangzhuang and Zhang Yimou, employed their own unique
modes of resistance in developing their film work. In the case of Director Tian, he chose a
historical mode of resistance to censorship as exemplified in The Blue Kite. As he stated “Just
think about how many historical changes China has undergone in the fifty years I have been
alive. The changing environment forces us to continually readjust ourselves. These changes in
society and our environment bring out what a person really is, and allow us to have a new
understanding of human nature.”91
Director Tian’s first films, On the Hunting Ground (1985) and Horse Thief (1986), had
highlighted his interest in non-Han Chinese minorities, which had been part of his down-to-the-
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countryside experience. He attempted to introduce dialects in these films, testing the 1930s
edict banning dialects, using Tibetan exclusively, but the Chinese censors rejected it and Tian
“…had a Mandarin audio track dubbed specifically for the purpose of getting the film past the
censors.”92 This focus on the “…linguistic violence…” that denied the differences within the
Chinese nation93 is a recurring theme in his mode of resistance to censorship that Director Tian
brought as his contribution to the Fifth Generation filmmakers’s philosophy. In these films, Tian
followed his cultural resistance to the broadest limits:
The exoticized and even romanticized images of the harsh Tibetan landscape serve as
vehicles for widening the gulf between the audience and the subjects of the film. Few in
China could relate to the open territory, uncrowdedness, lawlessness, and isolation of
Tibet or Mongolia as they are portrayed in Tian’s films. …[T]he absence of the Han in
the films, and anything to which they can relate, makes the film alien, and alienating, to
the viewer. This is deliberate.94
With The Blue Kite, Director Tian utilized an epic format to follow the lives of a family
throughout the Maoist era.
Like Yellow Earth, the
story is told in simple,
straightforward lines. The
drama happens to the
family; the characters are

not dramatic in themselves.

Image 2. Scene from The Blue Kite. Child, Tietou with Mother.

Rather they are real people swept up in the political madness that surrounds them. The power of
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The Blue Kite lies in this very lack of melodrama, in the omission of reaction. The criticism of
the gap between Communist ideology and society is brought into focus by simply recounting the
everyday struggles to survive of one family. The film draws great power from its use of staging
set within the confines of the family’s home. This serves as an unspoken rebuke in its complete
antithesis to the mandated revolutionary paradigms put forward by Jiang Qing.

History has

very real consequences for even the most mundane aspects of human existence. The historical
events it depicts, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Four No’s campaign
(1958-1962)95 are handled with quiet yet powerful realism. For, although The Blue Kite is far
more open in its political criticism due to its storyline, its protest still is not overt, using only the
tool of ambiguity that is the capstone of the early Fifth Generation films.
Again the cinematic device of color is richly used against the everyday texture of the
storyline. The central image of the beautiful free blue kite makes its appearance at critical stages
in the central character’s life and helps tie the plotline together. The use of a child’s song
mirrors the melancholic refrains of Yellow Earth. Director Tian was not looking to create pathos.
As he noted, “…I always despised scar literature, I always felt that, to some degree, it was
simply a new propaganda tool for the post-Cultural Revolution incarnation of the Chinese
Communist Party.”96
Tian had to complete post-production of The Blue Kite in Japan. It was subsequently
presented at the Cannes Film Festival in 1993 to great international acclaim and simultaneously
banned by the Chinese Film Bureau. The Chinese censors were even more stringent, however,
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and actually issued a decree “…that Tian…should not be allowed to make any more films. Nor
was he to be allowed access to filmmaking equipment and premises. Two years later his
production office in the Beijing Film Studio was decorated with a framed copy of the official
statement revoking the earlier ban, now that Tian…had shown necessary contrition. Tian’s
response to being asked about contrition is unprintable.”97
In Raise the Red Lantern, Zhang Yimou presented his cultural mode of resistance to
Chinese censorship. His focus in this film is not to present a particular historical timeframe but
rather to examine tradition and its associated social mores in the context of the repression of
authority. Director Zhang’s films generally focus around a female protagonist. He claims that
while this “…fits in with my own sensibilities,” it came about due to the fact that all his films
were adaptations of novels that happen to use a female perspective.98 99 Of course, his personal
and professional relationship with the
leading lady of most of his major films,
Gong Li, has been a major influence on
his choice of viewpoint.
Through the lens of sheer
cinematic opulence, gender politics is
Image 3. Scene from Raise the Red Lantern,
showing the courtyard house where Songlian finds herself
trapped forever.

made palpable and exaggerated in every
aspect in Raise the Red Lantern. Set

vaguely sometime in the 1920s, Director Zhang opens his work by focusing in on the young
university student, Songlian, who speaks to her unseen stepmother and directly faces the camera.
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Songlian’s father has died and although she has had one year at university, she feels that she
might as well marry a rich man because “such is a woman’s fate.” So, although she shows her
initial bravado and independence from tradition by walking to her new household rather than
taking the customary bridal sedan, she conforms to her perceived social providence. Once she
enters her husband’s household, Songlian is quite literally trapped in a maze as the very grid of
the exquisite mansion physically foreshadows the labyrinthine emotional relationships she will
encounter. This depicts the culture of the sanheyuan or Chinese courtyard house, an example of
classical Chinese architecture. Confucian ideology is at the heart of its design in which the space
is defined in accordance with intricate social rules as “…it is believed that only when families
are well run, will the state also be well governed.”100 Here Songlian starts to learn that nothing is
what it seems on the surface; her initial impressions of the wives and concubines she must share
the rest of her life with are shallow and premature. Her house and courtyard are exquisite in
their perfection, and the colors are rich, bold, and sumptuous--in keeping with Zhang Yimou’s
renowned cinematographic style. However, the beauty is so flawless and stylized that it is
almost sterile. The camera shots too are somehow remote in that they are very formally
arranged, like painterly compositions rather than real life. The psychology of this backdrop is
purposeful. As the director reveals, “When tragedy is ‘made aesthetic’…, it is all the more
overpowering.”101
Songlian quickly realizes that the rules and traditional customs followed in the household
are degrading. For all the richness that surrounds them, the women are mere tokens, totally
subservient to the male. Time has stopped in this place, and the social structure binds the women
together in unity and jealousy with no escape. Even the sky is glimpsed only sparingly, as the
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camera is kept level with the characters, furthering the sense of claustrophobia in the
compound.102 However, it is the red lanterns and the significance of their relentless daily
positioning that serves as the central symbol of this film. Zhang Yimou made the story and its
theme his own by creating and adding the image of the red lanterns into the plot.103 The whole
world within the repressive walls of the mansion revolves around the daily determination of who
will be honored by their lord and master by the mounting of the red lanterns. They are a symbol
of power and feudal domination, “…at once an image of beauty and a symbol of the patriarchal
oppressiveness of the system.”104
Songlian becomes enmeshed in the customs of the place and succumbs to its sensual
pleasures such as the exotic foot massage. However, the in-fighting among the wives and
concubines reveals the ugliness and deep hatreds that all the richness of the surroundings cannot
hide. Unraveling the physical maze takes Songlian to the pavilion where women were killed for
their disobedience to the males who control their very lives, and leads to the realization that she
is trapped in the inescapable psychological maze that society has cast her into. Because she is
naïve in many respects, this culminates in her lying to her husband that she is pregnant. It is the
beginning of her breakdown and her tragedy. The casting out of the lanterns upon the unfurling
of her lie is horrifically graphic, with all the color and light sucked out of her life. It is symbolic
death and every bit as profound. When she sees that she is directly responsible for the death of
her maid as well as her fellow concubine, her mind collapses. And yet the ritual of the red
lanterns continues inexorably as a new concubine takes the place vacated by the murdered
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concubine, and Songlian drifts madly through the rest of her days. The juggernaut of culture has
crushed free will and independence.
While the screenplay of Raise the Red Lantern had been approved by the Chinese
censors, the actual film was banned from Chinese cinemas and only released to an international
audience. However, it has served as a lightening rod around which Chinese critics have brought
together all their charges against the Fifth Generation filmmakers. This negative reaction had its
origin in the fact that Director Zhang’s previous film, Judou, won an Academy Award
nomination in 1991, and “…fifth-generation filmmaking seemed to have achieved a signal
honor.”105 But senior film censors had been extremely distressed as they understood this
nomination quite differently, seeing such an award uprooting their ban on releasing the film in
China. “The Chinese authorities’ ignorance of the effect that their interference might have in
galvanizing foreign opinion in defence of the film was a product of their long practice of
ignoring public opinion in their own country….”106 This began the discrediting of the Fifth
Generation films within their own country, an attack quite distinct from mere censorship.
Changing Worlds: Post-socialist Cinemas
The particular period that produced the signature films that introduced the Fifth
Generation filmmakers was a mirror of the political changes occurring within post-Mao China.
As a Communist nation “…after forty years of socialism, the people of mainland China …[had]
more in common with the people in the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Hungary than they
…[had] with the people in Taiwan.”107 Other Communist countries were also in the throes of
experiencing a new path due to shifting political values with the fall of the Iron Curtain and
glasnost. As a result, the failure of socialism has become increasingly the subject of modern
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cinema in all Communist countries. Films such as Polish film director Andrzej Wajda’s Man of
Marble (1977) and Man of Iron (1981) exemplify the tone of Eastern European cinema of the
period.108 “Their purpose is not to salvage socialism by advocating reform, but rather to
demonstrate that traditional socialist societies are afflicted with various and deeply rooted
terminal infirmities.”109
Captives of Censorship
For the Fifth Generation filmmakers, the initial disapproval of their new cinema style by
Chinese critics had been counterbalanced by their acclaim in international circles. “It is worth
noting that at no stage in its history has Fifth Generation cinema ever been positively endorsed in
China. In terms of both cultural position and film style, it has always been marginalized and
never recognized as a legitimate discourse or admitted to mainstream culture.110 Their rise to
fame in the West led to increasing rumblings against their work by national critics. In speaking
of their films, such phrases would be applied to them as: “…the ‘superficial pretense’
consciously pursued by directors like Zhang Yimou,”111 with Director Zhang “…humorously
given the nickname dejiangzhuanyehu, or “the awards expert.”112 Even more searing critiques
indicted their films, pointing to the “…self-Orientalizing male elite narrative…gory, cruel, and
charming stories about women…[that] win them a ticket ‘to the world.’ Or the attention of the
West.”113
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History was rapidly changing against the backdrop of their new Chinese cinema. The
1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre had profoundly altered the course of Chinese history. Teng
Jinxian became the new head of the Film Bureau under the Ministry of Radio, Film and
Television in mid-1990, heralding a return to the 1950’s style of political propaganda films.114
“Teng charged that filmmakers are guilty of “national nihilism” and “blindly worship Western
film theory and artistic genres….[condemning] filmmakers …interested in the subject of human
nature.”115
Economic changes came into play as well. Unions used to buy large blocks of movie
tickets for their workers, basically subsidizing both good and bad films by ensuring an audience.
But when the economy declined, these sales declined from 70 percent in the1980s to 20 percent
in 1998.116
This was also the time in which the state film industry crumpled like the proverbial paper
tiger. When Chen and his colleagues started their careers, money was not something to
be worried about. Their films, made with extravagant sets, often in remote locations,
were solidly backed by the official studios, however unsuccessful they were financially.
The situation could not last. Trapped in a vicious cycle of bad films, bad politics, and
bad management, the big studios were going bankrupt in all but name. By the time the
state monopoly started to loosen its grip over film markets, the audience for local movies
had dropped off.117
Consumerism was providing the people with expanded media choices. Cable TV and
special shows featuring the latest releases from Hong Kong and Hollywood became the public’s
choice. “On those occasions when only mainland-made movies were available, some exhibitors
took to shutting down the theater completely, since they could only expect to lose money.118
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The international awards that had propelled the Fifth Generation filmmakers to
recognition now caused them to be caught up in a vortex.

They had the advantage of their

reputations to obtain foreign funding for their films. However, “…the situation added new
pressures to win international prizes: on top of what they did for the national psyche, they
provided calculable marketing advantages, a seal of commercial viability.”119 Yet when the
directors brought forward films, such as Director Zhang’s Hero or Director Chen’s The Promise,
using the scale and equaling the caliber of Hollywood commercial ventures, “The Fifth
Generation, once heralded as brilliant enfants terribles, were now to be unmasked as a group of
overrated, callow, and pretentious self-promoters.”120 Caught up in a dual dilemma, even the
issue of censorship has come under scrutiny, creating a situation in which “…some overseas
distributors…ask if they could claim a given film is ‘banned’ in mainland China as a promotion
strategy even though the film has obtained permits from censors.”121 122
The response of the Fifth Generation filmmakers is to continue their experiments with
films. Director Zhang “…has consistently insisted since the 1980s that, despite his international
success, his target audience in all his films is Chinese” and, in fact, he has never learned English
and retains his home in Beijing.123 The Fifth Generation filmmakers earned their reputations by
their manipulation of censorship, taking bold steps forward to advance Chinese cinema, and
establishing a unique position in cinema. Yet, when they should have been able to experiment
further, the Fifth Generation filmmakers find themselves trapped in their own renown, subject as
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“…prophet[s]…[who are] not without honor save in…[their] own country and in …[their] own
house” to national criticism disavowing their accomplishments.124
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Appendix of Images
Image 1. of Yellow Earth, found through Google in an online blog by Francis Cruz. Lessons
from the School of Inattention: Oggs’ Movie Thoughts, November 11, 2007.
http://oggsmoggs.blogspot.com/2007/11/yellow-earth-1984.html.
Image 2. of Raise the Red Lantern, found through Google in an online blog by mkp. The Film
Sufi: Devoted to Discussion of Film Expression, November 5, 2009.
http://filmsufi.blogspot.com/2009/11/raise-red-lantern-zhang-yimou-1991.html.
Image 3. of The Blue Kite, found through Google in an online blog by Ike Cinecult. February
17, 2010.
http://cinemaurum.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/%e8%93%9d%e9%a3%8e%e7%ad%9d1993/.
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